Monday 2 February 2015

fundamental rights and DPSP


Relationship between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy

1)      The fundamental rights are enforceable in a court of law whereas the Directive principles are not justiciable.

2)      Art. 37 declares that the DPSP are fundamental in governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply directive principles in making laws.

3)      Chronological order that led to current relationship between DPSP and fundamental rights :

a.      The Supreme Court held that the DPSP cannot override the fundamental rights and such a law is void. On this ground the Supreme Court held the Bank Nationalisation Act and Privy Purses (Abolition) Act as unconstitutional.

b.      In 1971, the 25th Amendment Act introduced Art. 31C, which states that if the State enacts any law giving effect to two directive principles viz. equitable distribution of wealth [Art. 39(b)] and prevention of concentration of wealth in fewer hands [Art. 39(c)] and if law violates the fundamental rights enumerated in Art. 14, 19 and 31, it cannot be held void.

c.       Art. 31C further stated that such a law cannot be questioned in a court of law. This part of the Article was declared unconstitutional by the Court, thereby reinstating judicial review, in Kesavananda Bharati case (1973).

d.      42nd Amendment Act further amended Art. 31C and widened its scope and gave precedence for all directive principles over Art. 14, 19 and 31 and the law made to this effect were made immune from judicial review.

e.      The Supreme Court in the Minerva Mills case (1980) struck down the changes introduced by 42nd Amendment Act in Art. 31C.

f.        Present Position - Only Art. 39(b) and (c) can be given precedence over Art. 14 and 19 and not all the Directive Principles (Art. 31 was removed by 44th Amendment Act)

4)      Even as regards to fundamental rights other that those under Art. 14, 19 and 31, though the directives cannot directly override them, in determining the scope and ambit of the fundamental rights, the Court may not entirely ignore the Directive Principles and should adopt the principle of harmonious construction.

Ø  For instance, the Supreme Court has relied upon Art. 39A (free legal aid) in determining the duty of the State in making a law under Art. 21, depriving a person of his personal liberty, and held that where a prisoner has a right to appeal, the State should provide him a free copy of the judgement and also engage a counsel for him at the cost of the State.

5)      In interpretation of statutes, the Court bear in mind that the Directive Principles are not in conflict with but complementary to the fundamental rights and enable the State to impose certain duties upon the citizens.
For example, making the law to ensure minimum wages to workers in accordance with the Directives in Art. 43.

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